Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

According to the lower court, the child victim is also the perpetrator of a sex crime against himself. 

Argued that a ten-year-old is unlikely to fully understand and appreciate the nature of his Miranda rights and should not be able to waive them on his own.

Argued that sentences of 133 years and 68 years for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses, with only the possibility of geriatric release, are unconstitutional as they fail to provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release as mandated by Graham v. Florida.

Argued that Missouri’s Armed Criminal Action statute, as applied to juveniles, is unconstitutional because its mandatory incarceration provision provides no opportunity to consider a juvenile’s reduced culpability, age, and related characteristics as required by Graham and Miller.

Argued that, given the significance of the child’s liberty interests at stake, due process requires appointment of counsel for children in dependency proceedings.

Our brief argued that Nathan had a constitutionally protected right to conflict-free counsel that was violated when the representation was allowed to proceed. Our brief argued that special scrutiny is required when a child’s liberty interest is at stake and the parent and child’s interest diverge so that the parent cannot play the traditionally protective parental role.

Our brief argued that automatic exclusion from juvenile court of certain youth charged with murder when combined with the imposition of mandatory sentences is unconstitutional, pursuant to recent Supreme Court rulings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, which established that youth are fundamentally different from adults in constitutionally relevant ways.

We argued that an Ohio statute's presumption that a recorded custodial statement is prima facie voluntary violates constitutional due process requirements.

Our brief argued that Mr. Walker’s sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. Alabama, which banned mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.

Argued that the Oregon Appellate Court's interpretation of the state's juvenile transfer statute was so narrow that virtually all cases for youth aged 12 -14 will qualify for transfer to adult criminal court.