Legal Docket

Argued that Martin, sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile before Miller v. Alabama, is entitled to have his sentence revisited based on the second exemption to the prohibition on filing a second or successive habeas petition, which allows a subsequent petition when it is premised on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."

Argued that 19-year-old youth who works full time is eligible for extended dependency jurisdiction until age 21 under Act 91, Pennsylvania’s new law extending foster care to age 21. If a child is dependent, the juvenile court has plenary authority to craft and order a disposition that best meets the child’s needs and the purposes of the Juvenile Act, regardless of the funding source necessary to secure the disposition.

Argued that Illinois' statutory sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it subjects youth to mandatory sentencing schemes upon conviction without the opportunity for any judicial review before being tried in adult court.

Argued that rulings on discretionary transfers from juvenile to adult criminal court are subject to immediate appeal.

Argued that Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, as applied to juveniles, violates the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions and the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.

Argued that Colorado's mandatory statutory sentencing scheme for juveniles convicted of first degree murder is unconstitutional, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Alabama. 

Argued that Massachusetts' sentencing scheme for juveniles 14 and older convicted of first degree murder is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama and that the Massachusetts Supreme Court must look to existing statutes to determine what constitutional sentence may be imposed. 

Argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences in Miller v. Alabama should apply retroactively to juveniles who were sentenced to life without parole before the ban. 

Argued that California's sentencing statute, in which the presumptive sentence for any juvenile age 16 or older convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama.