Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

Argued that Ohio’s mandatory transfer law is unconstitutional because it does not allow for individualized determinations on the propriety of prosecuting certain minors in adult criminal court rather than juvenile court.

Argued that 19-year-old youth who works full time is eligible for extended dependency jurisdiction until age 21 under Act 91, Pennsylvania’s new law extending foster care to age 21. If a child is dependent, the juvenile court has plenary authority to craft and order a disposition that best meets the child’s needs and the purposes of the Juvenile Act, regardless of the funding source necessary to secure the disposition.

Argued that Martin, sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile before Miller v. Alabama, is entitled to have his sentence revisited based on the second exemption to the prohibition on filing a second or successive habeas petition, which allows a subsequent petition when it is premised on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."

Argued that Miller v. Alabama's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences should apply retroactively to those handed down that sentence before Miller, and that every child convicted of murder in Michigan must receive an individualized sentence and, if life without parole is determined to be appropriate, the child must be afforded a meaningful opportunity for release.

Argued that Illinois' statutory sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it subjects youth to mandatory sentencing schemes upon conviction without the opportunity for any judicial review before being tried in adult court.

Argued that Petitioner's sentencing, as a juvenile, of life without possibility of parole is unconstitutional pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. Alabama, which banned mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.

Argued that the court should clarify that Miller establishes a presumption against imposing juvenile life without parole; establish clear guidelines to ensure juvenile life without parole is not imposed arbitrarily and capriciously; and hold that juvenile life without parole can never be imposed when a juvenile is convicted based on a finding of “complicity.”

Argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences in Miller v. Alabama should apply retroactively to juveniles who were sentenced to life without parole before the ban. 

Argued that California's sentencing statute, in which the presumptive sentence for any juvenile age 16 or older convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama. 

Argued that two juveniles' sentences of 70 and 90 years in prison for non-homicide offenses are unconstitutional pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama.