Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

Argued that Missouri’s Armed Criminal Action statute, as applied to juveniles, is unconstitutional because its mandatory incarceration provision provides no opportunity to consider a juvenile’s reduced culpability, age, and related characteristics as required by Graham and Miller.

Argued that, given the significance of the child’s liberty interests at stake, due process requires appointment of counsel for children in dependency proceedings.

Our brief argued that Nathan had a constitutionally protected right to conflict-free counsel that was violated when the representation was allowed to proceed. Our brief argued that special scrutiny is required when a child’s liberty interest is at stake and the parent and child’s interest diverge so that the parent cannot play the traditionally protective parental role.

Our brief argued that automatic exclusion from juvenile court of certain youth charged with murder when combined with the imposition of mandatory sentences is unconstitutional, pursuant to recent Supreme Court rulings in Roper, Graham, and Miller, which established that youth are fundamentally different from adults in constitutionally relevant ways.

We argued that an Ohio statute's presumption that a recorded custodial statement is prima facie voluntary violates constitutional due process requirements.

Our brief argued that Mr. Walker’s sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. Alabama, which banned mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles.

Argued that the Oregon Appellate Court's interpretation of the state's juvenile transfer statute was so narrow that virtually all cases for youth aged 12 -14 will qualify for transfer to adult criminal court.

Our brief argued that juvenile's sentence to an extreme term of years sentence deprives them of a meaningful and realistic opportunity to obtain release and is thus unconstitutional pursuant to Graham v. Florida and Miller v. Alabama.

Argued that sentencing juveniles to extreme term-of-years sentences deprives them of a meaningful and realistic opportunity to obtain release and is thus unconstitutional pursuant to Graham v. Florida.

Argued that placing the words “sex offender” on juvenile's driver’s license imposes stigma and restrictions in violation of procedural due process, as well as infringes reputation rights which are expressly protected by the Louisiana Constitution.