Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

We argue that a lengthy term of years sentence of 42-to-75 years imposed on a 15-year-old violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. We further argued that Mr. Castaner’s 42-year minimum sentence not only exceeds other Wyoming sentences but also exceeds the maximum sentence allowed for second-degree murder in most jurisdictions across the country and exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment permitted before parole eligibility – 25 years – under Wyoming law for a life sentence for first-degree murder, making his 42-year minimum sentence for second-degree murder disproportionate and arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Our brief presented substantial research demonstrating that older adolescents, including 19-year-olds like Mr. Hazard, share the same developmental characteristics the Supreme Court relied on in Miller to hold that mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional for youth under 18 and urged the court to o follow the lead of state supreme courts in Michigan, Massachusetts, and Washington, which have all recently found that mandatory life without parole is unconstitutional for youth under 21.

The brief argued that the fundamental right to family integrity extends to children and that in order to protect children’s right to family integrity, it is essential to protect children’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless “emergency” removals by requiring agencies to take a narrowly tailored approach in their interventions and applying a rigorous and strict standard of review when evaluating those interventions. Additionally, the brief emphasized that children suffer long-term emotional and psychological harm that negatively impact them in adulthood when they are unnecessarily separated from their parents.

We argued that Mr. Daniel did not receive an individualized sentencing hearing to assess his youth and its attendant characteristics, as required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022). We further argued that Mr. Daniel’s youth was likely used against him due to the racist “superpredator” myth that led to the disproportionate punishment of Black youth like Mr. Daniel in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Amici argued that the district court’s order has far-reaching consequences that will deprive youth of systemwide remedies for violations of their constitutional rights and that institutional reform litigation is necessary to secure constitutional protections, particularly for historically marginalized groups, and has delivered meaningful, long-lasting results.

We argued that current research supports affording 20-year-olds the same sentencing protections that the Michigan Supreme Court previously extended to 18-year-olds because 20-year-olds share essentially the same developmental characteristics as 18-year-olds and are equally less culpable than older adults.

Our brief highlighted the unique and devastating harms that youth in the foster system suffer when they are banned from visiting their incarcerated parents in person, including the perspectives of Juvenile Law Center’s youth advocates with experience navigating these harms. Our brief further argued that in-person visits with incarcerated parents are critical to the wellbeing of children in the foster system, especially because visitation is crucial to the goal of family reunification. Finally, we discussed the ways in which St. Clair County Jail’s ban on in-person family visits entrenches racial and economic disparities. Our brief details the foster system’s disproportionate separation of Black, Latine, and Indigenous families.

The brief focused on (I) stark racial disparities in the administration of New York’s felony murder law, (II) the manifest injustice that occurred in Mr. Joseph’s case given the unavailability of a justification defense for the felony murder charge; (III) the felony murder doctrine’s dissonance with research on youth brain development; and (IV) the unconstitutional sentence imposed on Mr. Joseph as a result of these factors.

We argued that (1) children in foster care have a substantive due process right to a safe living environment based on their clearly established special relationship with the Commonwealth, and (2) the proper legal standard for analyzing substantive due process claims by youth in foster care is whether the state actors responsible for their care substantially departed from accepted professional judgment, pursuant to Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). We also pointed out the importance of applying protective legal standards in such cases, given the grave risks of harm to youth in care and that Black and Hispanic/Latine youth are disproportionately represented in the Massachusetts system.

Our brief explained that the superpredator theory arose from a long history of dehumanizing Black people and the deeply entrenched stereotype that Black people are predisposed to violent criminality. We emphasized that although the superpredator myth was false, it had a lasting impact on legislation across the country. We further emphasized that life without parole sentences are disproportionately imposed on Black youth and emerging adults.