Legal Docket

Argued that Pennsylvania's Sex Offender Registration Notification Act (SORNA), which requires youth to register on a sex offender registry for life, violates youths' rights under various provisions of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, as well as Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act.

Argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles in Miller should apply retroactively to inmates like Gordon, who was sentenced prior to the Miller ruling.

Argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles in Miller should apply retroactively to inmates like Mares, who was sentenced prior to the Miller ruling.

Argued that the juvenile court erred by waiving its jurisdiction of a youth and transferring the youth to adult court based on the charged offense alone, without an individualized determination of the youth's maturity, culpability, and capacity for change.

Argued that Ohio’s mandatory transfer law is unconstitutional because it does not allow for individualized determinations on the propriety of prosecuting certain minors in adult criminal court rather than juvenile court.

Argued that Miller v. Alabama's ban on mandatory life without parole sentences should apply retroactively to those handed down that sentence before Miller, and that every child convicted of murder in Michigan must receive an individualized sentence and, if life without parole is determined to be appropriate, the child must be afforded a meaningful opportunity for release.

Argued that Martin, sentenced to life without parole as a juvenile before Miller v. Alabama, is entitled to have his sentence revisited based on the second exemption to the prohibition on filing a second or successive habeas petition, which allows a subsequent petition when it is premised on "a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable."

Argued that 19-year-old youth who works full time is eligible for extended dependency jurisdiction until age 21 under Act 91, Pennsylvania’s new law extending foster care to age 21. If a child is dependent, the juvenile court has plenary authority to craft and order a disposition that best meets the child’s needs and the purposes of the Juvenile Act, regardless of the funding source necessary to secure the disposition.

Argued that Illinois' statutory sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it subjects youth to mandatory sentencing schemes upon conviction without the opportunity for any judicial review before being tried in adult court.

Argued that rulings on discretionary transfers from juvenile to adult criminal court are subject to immediate appeal.