Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

Amici argued on behalf of a 9-year-old foster child that independent, client-directed, legal counsel is necessary to help protect children’s physical liberty interests including: determinations regarding where and with whom the child will live and attend school, what, if any, contact the child will be allowed or required to have with family members, and the course of medical and mental health treatment.

We argued that the death penalty is unconstitutional as applied to 18- to 21-year-olds because they share many of the defining characteristics of youth under the age of 18 that inherently make them less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults.

We argued that Colorado's sex offender registration requirements are based on false presumptions about juvenile sexual offending and irreparably harm young offenders.

We urged the court to grant Mr. Taylor’s habeas petition and clarify the process and standards for others similarly situated in light of the fact that Miller and Montgomery establish a presumption against life without parole.

We argued that Arizona's postconviction evidentiary hearing is an inappropriate prerequisite to resentencing juvenile lifers because it places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate eligibility for a resentencing hearing.

We argued against the criminalization of children's ordinary schoolroom conduct such as "burping, laughing, and leaning into the classroom" and highlighted the devastating cost that such criminalization would have on children's education, health, and life chances.

Juvenile Law Center filed an amicus brief on behalf of a 15-year-old who was transferred to adult court without citing any specific findings of fact or evidence underpinning the transfer decision, and subsequently sentenced to 99 years in an adult prison.

Our brief argued that because Mr. Rainer’s sentence deprives him of a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” as mandated by Graham and Miller, it is the functional equivalent of life without parole and is unconstitutional despite being labeled as a term-of-years sentence. We further argued that even when juveniles commit multiple nonhomicide offenses they are entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” under Graham.

We argued that an aggregate term-of-years sentence of 40 to life for nonhomicide offenses committed by a juvenile is the functional equivalent of life without parole and is therefore unconstitutional.

We argued that an aggregate sentence of 96 years for second degree murder under a theory of complicity is a nonhomicide crime under Graham because it does not require that a defendant kill or intend to kill, and is the functional equivalent of life without parole because it fails to provide a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”