Posts in 'Amicus Curiae'

We argued that parole availability does not remedy a sentencing court's failure to give mitigating effect to the youth-related factors set forth in Miller.

We argued that Miller creates a presumption against sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole.

We argued that Miller and Montgomery establish a presumption against life without parole, which requires a determination that a juvenile has no potential for rehabilitation prior to imposing a life without parole sentence.

We argued that Maryland's parole system is an unconstitutional ad hoc executive clemency system which fails to provide a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release" to youth sentenced to life or life equivalent terms.

We argued that research in adolescent development and neuroscience confirm that life without parole sentences categorically are unconstitutional when applied to children.

We argued that mandatory life sentences imposed on children are disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Such sentences are incompatible with the penological goals of deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation.

We argued that Louisiana’s routine imposition of juvenile life without parole demonstrates the need for a categorical bar on the sentence which disproportionally punishes African-American youth.

We argued that Washington’s statute permitting Miller-defendants to petition a sentencing review board for early release fails to meaningfully remedy an unconstitutional 75-year sentence imposed on a 17-year-old.

We argued that a juvenile's right to due process is violated when he is automatically transferred to the adult system contrary to U.S. and Washington Supreme Court precedent articulating that youth cannot be mandatorily treated as adults.

We argued that imposing felony murder liability on an unarmed 16-year-old decoy for the actions of an armed co-defendant in a robbery gone bad contravenes U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and adolescent neuroscientific research.